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Abstract. PMAC is a simple and parallel block-cipher mode of operation, which
was introduced by Black and Rogaway at Eurocrypt 2002. If instantiated with a
(pseudo)random permutation over n-bit strings, PMAC constitutes a provably secure
variable input-length (pseudo)random function. For adversaries making q queries,
each of length at most ` (in n-bit blocks), and of total length σ ≤ q`, the original
paper proves an upper bound on the distinguishing advantage of O(σ2/2n), while the
currently best bound is O(qσ/2n). In this work we show that this bound is tight by
giving an attack with advantage Ω(q2`/2n).
In the PMAC construction one initially XORs a mask to every message block, where
the mask for the ith block is computed as τi := γi · L, where L is a (secret) random
value, and γi is the i-th codeword of the Gray code. Our attack applies more generally
to any sequence of γi’s which contains a large coset of a subgroup of GF (2n).
We then investigate if the security of PMAC can be further improved by using τi’s that
are k-wise independent, for k > 1 (the original distribution is only 1-wise independent).
We observe that the security of PMAC will not increase in general, even if the masks
are chosen from a 2-wise independent distribution, and then prove that the security
increases to O(q2/2n), if the τi are 4-wise independent. Due to simple extension
attacks, this is the best bound one can hope for, using any distribution on the masks.
Whether 3-wise independence is already sufficient to get this level of security is left
as an open problem.
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1 Introduction
PMAC (for Parallelizable Message Authentication Code) is a block-cipher mode of operation,
introduced by Black and Rogaway at Eurocrypt 2002 [BR02]. The mode, when instantiated
with a block-cipher over {0, 1}n, constitutes a variable input-length pseudorandom function
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n (which is then typically used for message authentication, hence the
name). PMAC is slightly less efficient than, for example, modes based on CBC MAC, but
its main advantage is that unlike CBC-based MACs, it allows to process the message
blocks fully in parallel.
The secret key of PMAC specifies two permutations pi, pi′ over {0, 1}n, and a function
τ : N→ {0, 1}n for determining the masks. On input a message M = m1‖ . . . ‖m`,mi ∈
{0, 1}n, the output is computed as
PMACpi,pi′,τ (M) = pi′
(⊕`
i=1
pi(mi ⊕ τ(i))
)
. (1)
In [BR02], the key is just a single key K ∈ K for a block-cipher E : K× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
pi, pi′ are instantiated both with E(K, .), and the mask function is defined as τ(i) = γi · L,
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where γi is the ith Gray codeword1 and L = E(K, 0). This is a slightly idealized version
of PMAC, we will discuss all the simplifications we make in greater detail in Section 1.3.
1.1 Security of PMAC in the Random Permutation Model
The security of a block-cipher mode of operation is usually analyzed assuming the underlying
block-cipher under a random secret key realizes a uniformly random permutation. A bound
in this model then implies security when instantiated with a block-cipher, we just have to
add an extra term which bounds the advantage of distinguishing the block-cipher from a
random permutation (i.e., the PRP security of the block-cipher, cf. Eq.(4) in this paper).
[BR02] proved an upper bound of σ2/2n on the distinguishing advantage against PMAC
for any adversary making a total of q queries, each of length at most ` blocks (of n bits),
and a total of σ ≤ `q blocks. This was later improved to q2`/2n by Minematsu and
Matsushima at FSE’07 [MM07], and then to qσ/2n by Nandi at FSE’10 [Nan10] (note
that qσ can be much less than q2`, if the message lengths vary a lot).
In this work we show that this bound is tight by giving an attack with advantage
Ω(q2`/2n). For this, we show that it is possible to construct q messages M1, . . . ,Mq
(Ma = m(a)1 ‖m(a)2 ‖ . . . ‖m(a)` ), such that for any pair of messages (Ma,Mb),⊕`
i=1
pi(m(a)i ⊕ τ(i)) =
⊕`
i=1
pi(m(b)i ⊕ τ(i))
for `−1 different choices of L (where τ(i) = γi ·L). Thus, also the PMAC ofMa,Mb (which
additionally permutes this value) will collide. This directly gives a distinguishing attack,
and even a forgery as now Ma‖X and Mb‖X will collide for any string X. Moreover,
the set of L’s for which two messages collide will be mostly disjoint for the
(
q
2
)
pairs of
messages, so with q messages of length ` we will observe a collision with probability in the
order of q2`/2n.
Recently, Luykx et al. [LPSY16] showed that one can construct a pair of messages
which will collide with probability roughly `/2n, leading to an attack with advantage `/2n
for q = 2 messages. However, their attack does not generalize to q messages. In contrast,
our attack obtains this high collision probability for every of the
(
q
2
)
message pairs.
1.2 k-wise Independent Masks
Several works show that by somewhat changing the construction, one can boost the
security of PMAC [Yas11, Yas12, Zha15] even beyond the q2/2n birthday bound. We
investigate whether one can make the original construction more secure by just changing
the distribution of the masks.
As a warm-up, in Section 4 we prove that if the masks τ1, τ2, . . . are uniform and
independent, then the security indeed increases to O(q2/2n). This is the best we can hope
for under any distribution of masks: One can always query on random messages, and if
a collision is found (which occurs with probability q2/2n), add the same block to both
colliding messages, which will also lead to the same output.
The original distribution of masks in PMAC is only 1-wise independent, we investigate
if the security increases when using k-wise independent distributions for k > 1. In Section 6
we show that 2-wise independence in general does not increase security by constructing a
2-wise independent distribution which, for any set of messages, gives us exactly the same
collision probability as the original distribution. In Section 5 we show that using any
4-wise independent distribution on masks2 will boost the security to the optimal O(q2/2n).
Whether 3-wise independence is sufficient is left as an open problem.
1This encoding is chosen to allow for efficient sequential computation of the values γ1 · L, γ2, ·L, . . ..
2For example computed as τi =
∑3
j=0 Lj · ij for random Lj ∈ GF (2n).
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1.3 Variants of the PMAC Construction
The construction that we analyze is a somewhat simplified version of the actual original
PMAC as proposed in [BR02]. We now discuss the existing differences and the applicability
of our results to other variants.
One difference is that [BR02] specifies a padding which allows it to take as inputs
messages whose length is not a multiple of n, moreover, the last block is not permuted.
Additionally, a final mask (which is fixed and independent of `) is XORed to the state before
the outer permutation is applied. Our attacks and security proofs can be easily adapted
to take these things into account, we chose not to do so for the sake of conceptual and
notational simplicity. In particular, for our attack we choose q messages for the “simplified”
PMAC as in Eq. (1) in a way that maximises the probability of seeing a collision. XORing a
fixed value to the state before applying the outer permutation does not affect this collision
probability. To handle the fact that the last block is not permuted we can simply add an
arbitrary dummy message block to every message. Again, this will not affect the collision
probability.
Another difference is that for our security proofs we assume that the value L used for
the masks is sampled uniformly at random, while in the original construction L := pi(0).
This distinction does not matter as long as `q  2n (as then whp. none of the internal
queries made is 0), which is satisfied for our main security result (Lemma 4) using 4-wise
independent masks, as there we must assume ` ≤ 2n/2 anyway. For our “warm-up” proof
(Lemma 3) using independent random masks we don’t have to make such an assumption,
so here it’s not clear if the result still applies with this difference for very large `. This
distinction also doesn’t affect the success probability of our attack, which works for any
distribution on L.
Moreover, in the security proofs we also assume that the inner and outer permutations
pi, pi′ are independent, while in the original construction pi and pi′ are the same. If one
aims for security in the order of q2`/2n (or more generally σ`/2n), this can be handled:
informally, as there are q queries to pi′ and q` queries to pi, we expect them to overlap only
with probability q2`/2n, and as long as they do not overlap, we can treat them as if they
were independent. As we aim for q2/2n security, it is not clear whether assuming that pi
and pi′ are independent is without loss of generality. Again, for our attack this distinction
does not matter, the collision probability is the same no matter what pi′ is.
Let us also mention that there exists a later variant of PMAC due to Rogaway [Rog04]
called PMAC1, which for efficiency reasons deviates slightly from PMAC by using a different
sequence for the γi values. It is not clear if our attack can be adapted to this case. Informally,
we require the sequence of γ1, . . . , γ` to contain a large coset of a subgroup of GF (2n),
and it’s not clear if the sequence from [Rog04] contains such a set. Let us mention that
for similar reasons the attack from [LPSY16] does not apply to the [Rog04] construction
either.
Newer variations of PMAC include PMAC+ [Yas11], PMAC with parity [Yas12], and
PMACX [Zha15]. These introduce major modifications to the original constructions,
therefore we do not discuss them in more detail. Lastly, LightMAC [LPTY16] can be
considered a PMAC-like construction.
2 Preliminaries
Basic Definitions. For n ∈ N we define [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and {0, 1}n∗ := ⋃z∈N{0, 1}nz
denotes the set of all bitstrings whose length is a multiple of n. In a slight abuse of
notation, we interchangeably view strings from {0, 1}n∗ also as finite sequences of blocks
from {0, 1}n, i.e., for s ∈ {0, 1}nz we also write s = (s1, . . . , sz) for si ∈ {0, 1}n. The
(bit)length of a string w is |w|, and if |w| is a multiple of n, |w|n = |w|/n denotes the
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length in n bit blocks. w` := w‖w‖ . . . ‖w denotes the `-fold concatenation of w. We
usually denote sets by calligraphic letters like X . Fb,c (resp. Fb∗,c) denotes the set of
all functions from {0, 1}b to {0, 1}c (resp. from {0, 1}b∗ to {0, 1}c), FN,b is the set of all
functions N→ {0, 1}b and Pn the set of all permutations on {0, 1}n. If P is a (finite or
infinite) progression, then by P[`] we denote a tuple containing the first ` elements of P .
A partition of a set S is a collection of non-empty subsets Ai, such that if Ai 6= Aj , then
Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅, and
⋃
Ai = S.
Multisets. We denote with mult(x,X ) the multiplicity of an element x in a multiset X .
X ↓ is the subset of X that contains only the elements of odd multiplicity, i.e.,
X ↓ = {x ∈ X : mult(x,X ) mod 2 = 1} .
Groups and Cosets. For a definition of a commutative group and a discussion of the
notions introduced below, see e.g. [Jor94]. All the groups that we consider in this paper
will be commutative, and we will use additive notation for groups. A subgroup of G is
any subset H that is a group by itself. The order of G, denoted |G| is the number of its
elements. Lagrange’s theorem states that if H is a subgroup of G, then |H| divides |G|.
Let G be a group, and H its subgroup. Take g ∈ G. Then the set g +H := {g + h :
h ∈ H} is called a coset of H in G. Note that trivially any group G is a coset (of G in
G), we call a coset proper if it is not a group. The set of different cosets of H in G forms
a partition of G; and moreover, H itself appears in it as the coset 0 +H, where 0 is the
neutral element of G (and H). The size of a coset is again referred to as its order. Finally,
the order of G is equal to the product of the order of H and the number of different cosets
of H.
Random Variables and Experiments. Random variables and concrete values they can
take are usually denoted by upper-case letters X,Y, . . . and lower-case letters x, y, . . .
respectively.
If M is a distribution (respectively, a set), then we denote by X $← M sampling
the random variable X according to M (respectively, choosing it uniformly at random
fromM). By X` we denote ` independent and identically distributed copies of a random
variable X. A joint probability distribution of q random variables (X1, . . . , Xq) is k-wise
independent, if its restriction to any k coordinates is uniform over its domain, e.g., if all
Xi have domain {0, 1}n
∀i1, . . . , ik , 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ≤ q ; ∀x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n :
Pr(X1,...,Xq) ((Xi1 , . . . , Xik) = (x1, . . . , xk)) =
(
2−n
)k
.
More generally, letMn be a probability distribution over FN,n. In this case, we callMn
k-wise independent, if any k outputs of f(·) sampled fromMn are independent. Formally,
Mn is k-wise independent, if:
∀i1, . . . , ik , 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ik ; ∀x1, . . . , xk ∈ {0, 1}n :
Pr
f
$←Mn
((
f(i1), . . . , f(ik)
)
= (x1, . . . , xk)
)
=
(
2−n
)k
.
Adversaries. In this work an adversary is a probabilistic (polynomial time or computa-
tionally unbounded) algorithm, sometimes with access to an oracle O(·). We use sans-serif
letters for adversaries, e.g., AO(·), and will only consider “distinguishers”, which are
adversaries, whose final output is just one bit.
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Pseudorandom functions and permutations. We call a function f : K ×D → R keyed,
where the first part of the input is referred to as the key (and K being called the keyspace
of f). We often write fk(·) instead of f(k, ·). Given a variable input-length keyed function
f : K × {0, 1}n∗ → {0, 1}n, the PRF-advantage of an adversary A against f is defined as
Advprff (A) := Pr[K
$← K : AfK(·) = 1]− Pr[R $← Fn∗,n : AR(·) = 1] .
We also define
Advprff (q, `, t) := maxA Adv
prf
f (A)
where the maximum goes over all adversaries that run in time at most t, and ask at
most q queries, each of length at most ` (in n-bit blocks). If we consider computationally
unbounded adversaries, we drop the last argument, i.e., Advprff (q, `) := Adv
prf
f (q, `,∞).
Pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) and their security notions are defined analogously.
Given a keyed permutation (i.e., a block-cipher) E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, the PRP-
advantage of an adversary A against E is defined as
AdvprpE (A) := Pr[K
$← K : AEK(·) = 1]− Pr[P $← Pn : AP(·) = 1] .
and
AdvprpE (q, t) := maxA Adv
prp
E (A)
where the maximum goes over all adversaries that run in time at most t and ask at most q
queries.
Collision security. For a keyed function f : K × {0, 1}n∗ → {0, 1}, we define
Advcolf (q, `) := max
M1,...,Mq
PrK←K[∃ i 6= j : fK(Mi) = fK(Mj)] ,
where the maximum goes over all q tuples of distinct messages of length at most ` blocks.
3 PMAC and Simplified PMAC
We define the simplified PMAC, sPMAC : Pn ×FN,n × {0, 1}n∗ → {0, 1}n as
sPMAC(pi, τ,m1‖ . . . ‖m`) :=
⊕`
i=1
pi(mi ⊕ τ(i)) .
PMAC : Pn × Pn × FN,n × {0, 1}n∗ → {0, 1}n is derived from sPMAC by additionally
encrypting the final output using an independent permutation pi′:
PMAC(pi, pi′, τ,M) = pi′(sPMAC(pi, τ,M))
To save on notation, we will sometimes write τi instead τ(i) and e.g., PMACpi,pi′,τ (M)
instead of PMAC(pi, pi′, τ,M), or, if pi, pi′, τ are clear from the context, simply PMAC(M).
The first three (two) arguments of PMAC (sPMAC) are the key; consider distributions
Π,Π′ over Pn, and Tn over FN,n, then PMACΠ,Π′,Tn(.) denotes a keyed function, where
the key is sampled according to (pi, pi′, τ)← Π×Π′ × Tn, and then defines the function
PMACpi,pi′,τ (.). If Π is instantiated by a block-cipher E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, we think
of it as the uniform distribution over the multiset of functions {E(k, ·) : k ∈ K}.
For an input message M = m1‖ . . . ‖m`, it will be convenient to define the following
variables
xi := mi ⊕ τi, ∀i ; X := (x1, . . . , x`) (2)
yi := pi(xi), ∀i ; Y := (y1, . . . , y`)
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pi
+
x1
m1
τ1
pi
+
x2
m2
τ2
+
pi
+
x3
m3
τ3
+
. . .
. . .
. . .
pi
+
x`−1
m`−1
τ`−1
+
pi
+
x`
m`
τ`
+
y1
y2 y3 y`−1 y`
Figure 1: The evaluation of sPMAC(pi, τ,m1‖ . . . ‖m`), where τi = τ(i).
We often consider pairs of messages M = m1‖ . . .ms,M ′ = m′1‖ . . . ‖m′s′ , then X ∗
denotes the multiset
xi := mi ⊕ τi , x′i := m′i ⊕ τi, ∀i ; X ∗ := (x1, . . . , xs, x′1, . . . , x′s′) (3)
We start by reducing the PRP-security of PMAC with a block-cipher E to the collision
security of sPMAC with a random permutation. The argument is fairly standard and
allows us to perform the rest of our analysis in the information-theoretic setting.
Lemma 1 (PRF security of PMAC from collision security of sPMAC). For a block-cipher
E : K × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and for any distribution Tn over FN,n, we have
AdvprfPMACE,E,Tn (q, `, t) ≤ 2 ·Adv
prp
E (`q, t′) +Adv
col
sPMACPn,Tn (q, `) +
q2
2n ,
where t′ ≤ t+O(`q).
Proof. We first replace the block-cipher E with uniformly random permutations, by a
straightforward reduction:
AdvprfPMACE,E,Tn (q, `, t) ≤ Adv
prf
PMACPn Pn,Tn (q, `, t) + 2 ·Adv
prp
E (`q, t′) . (4)
We can now consider computationally unbounded distinguishers (first step below), and
replace the outer permutation by a uniformly random function, using the PRF/PRP
switching lemma [BR06] in the second step:
AdvprfPMACPn,Pn,Tn (q, `, t) ≤ Adv
prf
PMACPn,Pn,Tn (q, `) ≤ Adv
prf
PMACPn,Fn,n,Tn (q, `) +
q2
2n (5)
Finally, we claim that distinguishing PMACPn,Fn,n,Tn from a random function is upper
bounded by the collision security of sPMACpi,τ , i.e.,
AdvprfPMACPn,Fn,n,Tn (q, `) ≤ Adv
col
sPMACPn,Tn (q, `) (6)
The statement of the Lemma follows from Eq.(4)-Eq.(6). It remains to prove Eq.(6).
As the outer function f ← Fn,n is uniformly random, the output of PMACpi,f,τ (.) ≡
f(sPMACpi,τ (.)) is uniformly random, conditioned on not having any collisions on the inner
function sPMACpi,τ (.). By Theorem 1.(i) from [Mau02], this implies that distinguishing
PMACpi,f,τ (.) from a random function is at least as hard as provoking a collision on
sPMACpi,τ (.), and further by Theorem 2 from [Mau02], adaptivity does not help in provoking
this condition. This concludes the proof of Eq.(6).
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A self-cancellation for a messageM (denoted seCan(M)) occurs, if for its corresponding
X , we have X ↓ = ∅. A cross-cancellation for two messages M,M ′ (denoted crCan(M,M ′))
occurs, if for their corresponding X ∗↓, we have X ∗↓ = ∅. A PMAC-collision for two mes-
sagesM,M ′ (denoted pCol(M,M ′)) occurs, if PMAC(M) = PMAC(M ′). We define sPMAC-
collision (spCol(M,M ′)) analogously. Note that crCan(M,M ′) implies spCol(M,M ′), and
spCol(M,M ′) implies pCol(M,M ′).
For a given n, ` and a distribution Tn, we define the following quantity with the xi’s as
defined in Eq.(2):
θ(`, n, Tn) = max
M 6=M ′
|M|n,|M′|n≤`
Pr
τ
$←Tn
[{
x1, x2, . . . , x|M |n , x
′
1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
|M ′|n
}↓
= ∅
]
. (7)
The quantity θ(`, n, Tn) bounds the maximum probability over all pairs of distinct messages
M,M ′ of maximum length `, that their reduced set X ∗↓ is empty, and hence a cross-
cancellation occurs. This probability is taken over the sampling of the mask according to
the distribution Tn.
The following lemma states that a cross-cancellation is indeed the dominant reason for
an sPMAC-collision to occur.
Lemma 2. For any n, Tn, and ` ≤ 2n−2
AdvcolsPMACPn,Tn (q, `) ≤ θ(`, n, Tn) · q2 +
q2
2n−1 .
Proof. By taking a union bound over all q messages, we can upper bound the probability
of a collision amongst the q messages by the probability of any pair colliding as:
AdvcolsPMACPn,Tn (q, `) ≤ Adv
col
sPMACPn,Tn (2, `) ·
(
q
2
)
≤ AdvcolsPMACPn,Tn (2, `) · q2 .
We upper bound AdvcolsPMACPn,Tn (2, `) by showing that for any M 6= M ′, |M |n, |M ′|n ≤ `
we have:
Pr(pi,τ)←Pn×Tn [sPMACpi,τ (M) = sPMACpi,τ (M ′)]
= Pr(pi,τ)←Pn×Tn [sPMACpi,τ (M) = sPMACpi,τ (M ′) ∧ crCan(M,M ′)] (8)
+ Pr(pi,τ)←Pn×Tn [sPMACpi,τ (M) = sPMACpi,τ (M ′) ∧ crCan(M,M ′)] (9)
≤ θ(`, n, Tn) + 12n − 2`
≤ θ(`, n, Tn) + 12n−1 (10)
Note that this proves the statement of the Lemma. In eq. (10), we have used ` ≤ 2n−2. The
term (8) can be upper bounded as (using that for any events E0, E1,Pr[E0 ∧E1] ≤ Pr[E0])
(8) ≤ Pr(pi,τ)←Pn×Tn [crCan(M,M ′)] ≤ θ(`, n, Tn) ,
where the 2nd step follows by definition.
It remains to upper bound the term (9) by 1/(2n − 2`). We first upper bound (9) by
fixing τ to the “worst case”, and condition on crCan (using Pr[E0 ∧ E1] ≤ Pr[E0|E1])
(9) ≤ max
τ
Prpi←Pn [sPMACpi,τ (M) = sPMACpi,τ (M ′) | crCan(M,M ′)]
As crCan(M,M ′), the set X ∗↓ = {a1, . . . , as} is non-empty and s ≤ 2`. A necessary (albeit
not sufficient) condition to have a collision is that
⊕s
i=1 pi(ai) = 0. We claim that
Prpi←Pn
[
s⊕
i=1
pi(ai) = 0
]
= Prpi←Pn
[
s−1⊕
i=1
pi(ai) = pi(as)
]
≤ 12n − s+ 1
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The first equality follows as A ⊕ B = 0, if and only if A = B. To see the second step,
assume the output of the random pi is defined in a lazy way (sampling a random image
without repetition for every fresh input), starting with inputs a1, . . . , as−1. Once these
have been defined, we know that pi(as) will be uniform over a set of size 2n − s+ 1, but at
most one value, namely pi(as) =
⊕s−1
i=1 pi(ai), will satisfy the required condition.
4 Independent Random Masks
In this section, as a warm-up, we look at the setting where the masks are chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random.
Lemma 3. For any n, ` ∈ N
θ(n, `,FN,n) ≤ 22n .
Before we prove the lemma, we note that this upper bound is tight: consider the
messages M = 0n‖0n and M ′ = 1n‖1n, then for any choice of τ1, we’ll have X ∗↓ =
{τ1, τ2, 1n ⊕ τ1, 1n ⊕ τ2} = ∅, if either τ2 = τ1, or τ2 = τ1 ⊕ 1n. As the τi are uniform,
Pr[(τ1 = τ2) ∨ τ1 = τ2 ⊕ 1n] = 2/2n.
Proof. Recall that θ(n, `,FN,n) is the probability, maximized over all M 6= M ′ of length
|M |n, |M ′|n ≤ `, that X ∗↓ = ∅. Let M = m1‖ . . . ‖ms, M ′ = m′1‖ . . . ‖m′s′ denote the
messages maximising this probability.
If s = s′, i.e., the messages are of same length, then let i be the smallest index where
mi 6= m′i (this i exists as M 6= M ′). Assume τ ← FN,n is sampled on all inputs, except i.
Consider the multiset Zi = X ∗ − (xi, x′i). Now, we claim X ∗↓ will be empty, if and only if
two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, Z↓i must contain exactly two elements, let’s call them
{a, b}. If this is not the case, then X ∗↓ will not be empty with probability 1.3
If it has exactly two elements {a, b}, then secondly, τ(i) must be chosen such that
{mi ⊕ τ(i),m′i ⊕ τ(i)} = {xi, x′i} = {a, b}. There are at most two possible values for τ(i),
which satisfy this condition (two, not just one, as the sets are not ordered). As τ(i) is
uniform, the probability it hits one of those two values is 2/2n.
Now let us consider the case where s 6= s′ (without loss of generality, s > s′). We can’t
use the above argument here as an index i with mi 6= m′i will not exist if M is a prefix
of M ′. In this case we assume τ(i) is given to us on all inputs except s+ 1. Following a
similar argument as with Z↓i above, there will be at most one value for τ(s+ 1) that will
cause X ∗↓ to be empty, which upper bounds the probability of X ∗↓ = ∅ to 1/2n.
Lemma 3, in combination with Lemmas 1 and 2, directly give us the following statement.
Theorem 1 (PMAC security with uniform masks). For any q, t, n, `, where ` ≤ 2n−2,
and block-cipher E with block-size n, we have
AdvprfPMACE,E,FN,n (q, `, t) ≤
5q2
2n + 2 ·Adv
prp
E (`q, t′) ,
where t′ ≤ t+O(`q).
3Intuitively, we need {a, b} and {xi, x′i} to cancel each other out for X ∗↓ = ∅. If Z↓i had more, or less
than precisely two elements, this would not be possible.
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5 4-wise Independent Masks
In this section we investigate the security of PMAC if the mask distribution Tn is 4-wise
independent. By the following lemma this assumption is sufficient to prove a bound of
order q2/2n (i.e., independent of the message length `) on the PRF-security of PMAC
assuming an exponential upper bound on `.
Lemma 4. For any n, ` ∈ N where ` ≤ 2n/2 and any 4-wise independent distribution Tn,
we have
θ(`, n, Tn) ≤ 42n . (11)
Proof. Let M = m1‖ . . . ‖ms,M ′ = m′1‖ . . . ‖m′s′ , s, s′ ≤ ` be messages maximizing the
probability in the definition of θ(`, n, Tn) (cf. Eq.(7)) for the 4-wise independent mask
distribution Tn.
We start with the case where s = s′. Let I = {i : mi 6= m′i} be the indices of message
blocks where the two messages differ, and X ∗I ⊆ X ∗ = {x1, . . . , xs, x′1, . . . , x′s} the multiset
containing only xi, x′i for i ∈ I. Note that X ∗↓ = X ∗↓I , since mi = m′i implies xi = x′i and
for any multiset S and any x such that mult(S, x) ≥ 2, we have S↓ = (S \ {x, x})↓. In
order to bound the probability that X ∗↓ = ∅, it suffices to bound the probability that
X ∗↓I = ∅, let us denote this event with Ecol.
If Ecol holds, then we can find a complete matching (i.e., a subgraph where every vertex
has degree exactly 1) in a graph, whose vertices are the elements of X ∗I and two vertices
are connected by an edge if and only if they have the same value. Note that if Ecol holds
then every value appears with even multiplicity, so this graph consists of cliques of even
size.
We will define a set of events {Eα,β : (α, β) ∈ (I × {0, 1})2} and prove that if |I| ≥ 4
(we will discuss the cases where |I| < 4, and s 6= s′ at the end), then:
i. For any α, β, Pr[Eα,β ] ≤ 2−2n.
ii. Ecol implies that for some α, β the event Eα,β holds.
The above two points then imply Pr[Ecol] ≤
∑
α,β Pr[Eα,β ] ≤ 22|I|2/22n ≤ 4`2/22n, which
is upper bounded by 4/2n if ` ≤ 2n/2, as claimed in the statement of the lemma.
It will be convenient to define the index of a message as α = (αi, αb) ∈ I×{0, 1}, where
mα = mαi if αb = 0 and mα = m′αi if αb = 1 (similarly for xα), so the part αi identifies
the block number and the bit αb indicates whether we consider M or M ′.
Let I = {i1, i2, . . .} and γ = (γi, γb) = (i1, 0), now the event Eα,β is defined as follows.
Let
δ = (δi, δb) = (min{I \ {γi, αi, βi}}, 0)
Note that above min{I \ {γi, αi, βi} is non-empty, as |I| ≥ 4. If γi = αi, or α = β, the
event Eα,β is defined to never hold, so from now on we assume this is not the case. Then
Eα,β is defined as
Eα,β ⇐⇒ (xγ = xα) ∧ (xδ = xβ) .
We first prove that
Prτ←Tn [Eα,β ] = Prτ←Tn [(xγ = xα) ∧ (xδ = xβ)]
= Prτ←Tn [xγ = xα]Prτ←Tn [xδ = xβ |xγ = xα]
= 2−n · 2−n .
To see the last step above, note that
Prτ←Tn [xγ = xα] = Prτ←Tn [mγ ⊕ τγi = mα ⊕ ταi ] = 2−n
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holds as τγi , ταi , coming from a 4-wise independent distribution, are uniformly random
and independent (recall we assume αi 6= γi). To show
Prτ←Tn [xδ = xβ |xγ = xα] = Prτ←Tn [mδ⊕τδi = mβ⊕τβi |mγ⊕τγi = mα⊕ταi ] = 2−n (12)
we note that, as the τi are 4-wise independent and δi 6∈ {αi, βi, γi}, the τδi is uniformly
random even given all the other masks ταi , τβi , τγi . This concludes the proof of the
condition (i), establishing that Pr[Eα,β ] ≤ 2−2n.
It remains to show condition (ii), claiming that Ecol implies that for some α, β the
event Eα,β holds. For this we simply note that if Ecol holds, then xγ (with γ as defined
above) must collide with at least some value xα, and then the value xδ (with δ as defined
above) must collide with some xβ , thus Eα,β holds.
We have so far assumed that |I| ≥ 4 and s = s′. If |I| < 4 (but we still assume s = s′),
then there are at most 2(|I| − 1) = 4 possible values xγ can collide with, this probability
is easily upper bonded by 4/2n (2-wise independence of the τi is sufficient here). As xγ
colliding with another value xα (where αi ∈ I) is a necessary condition for Ecol to hold,
the same upper bound holds of Ecol.
We now shortly describe how to adapt the proof if the messages have different lengths,
say s > s′. Let I again denote the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , s′} such that mi 6= m′i.
If 2|I| + (s′ − s) ≤ 6 then we use basically the same argument as for the |I| < 4
case above; To have the event Ecol the value xγ (where γ = (min{I}, 0), or if |I| = 0,
γ = (s′ + 1, 0)) must collide with some xα, and as there are at most 4 possibilities for
α this probability is at most 4/2n. If 2|I|+ (s′ − s) > 6 then we have at least 4 indices
(namely I and s′ + 1, . . . , s) with correspond to x’s that must collide, and for this one can
use a slight generalisation of the argument for |I| ≥ 4 from above.
Again, combining Lemma 4 with Lemmas 1 and 2 give us the following statement.
Theorem 2 (PMAC security with 4-wise independent masks). For any q, t, n and ` ≤ 2n/2,
any block-cipher E with block-size n, and any 4-wise independent distribution Tn over FN,n,
we have
AdvprfPMACE,E,Tn (q, `, t) ≤
7q2
2n + 2 ·Adv
prp
E (`q, t′) ,
where t′ ≤ t+O(`q).
6 2-wise Independent Masks
In Section 5, we showed that the security of PMAC with 4-wise independent masks
is q2/2n. On the other hand, in Section 7 we will show that when using the original
distribution on masks from [BR02], which is only 1-wise independent, the security is just
`q2/2n. This leaves open the question, whether we can get q2/2n security already using
any 2-wise or 3-wise independent distribution on masks. Below, we show that using a
2-wise independent distribution will in general not improve security: We slightly change the
original distribution to make it 2-wise independent, and observe that this does not change
the collision probability of sPMAC, and thus also attacker’s distinguishing advantage of
PMAC in the ideal permutation model, at all. Whether 3-wise independence is sufficient is
left as an open problem.
Recall that in [BR02] the masks are computed by means of a function chosen at random
from the following family
{i→ a · pi | a ∈ GF (2n)} ,
where pi is the i-th Gray codeword. For the following argument P = (p1, p2 . . . , p2n) can
be any progression without repetitions. Let Tn denote this distribution, and note that it is
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1-wise, but not 2-wise, independent. Let T+n denote the uniform distribution over
{i→ a · pi ⊕ b | a, b ∈ GF (2n)} ,
which is 2-wise independent.
By the following lemma, the collision security of sPMAC is exactly the same for Tn
and T+n , thus also the security of PMAC implied by Lemma 1 will be the same for both
distributions.
Lemma 5. Let Tn and T+n be distributions as defined above. Then we have
AdvcolsPMACPn,Tn (q, `) = Adv
col
sPMACPn,T+n
(q, `) .
Proof. Consider any messages M,M ′ and X ∗ = (x1, . . . , x|M |n , x′1, . . . , x′|M ′|n) where xi =
mi ⊕ a · pi ⊕ b, x′i = m′i ⊕ a · pi ⊕ b for random a, b, i.e., according to mask distribution
T+n . To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to observe that if X ∗↓ = ∅, then we will still have
X ∗↓ = ∅ even if we replace b with any other element of the field, in particular, we can
assume b = 0 in which case we get mask distribution Tn.
7 1-wise Independent Masks: PMAC with a Gray Code
In this section we analyse the PRF-security of PMAC with a one-wise independent mask
distribution.
The Gray Code. The original PMAC construction uses a mask distribution based on a
Gray code, which is an example of a one-wise independent distribution. A Gray code is an
ordering γ` = γ`0γ`1 . . . γ`2`−1 of {0, 1}`, for any ` ≥ 1, such that successive points differ in
precisely one bit. The canonical Gray code from [BR02] is defined as follows:
γ1 = (γ10 , γ11) := (0, 1)
γ2 = (γ20 , γ21 , γ22 , γ23) := (00, 01, 11, 10)
...
γ`+1 = (0γ`0, 0γ`1, · · · , 0γ`2`−2, 0γ`2`−1, 1γ`2`−1, 1γ`2`−2, · · · , 1γ`1, 1γ`0)
In PMAC the sequence τ1, τ2, . . . of masks is defined as τi := γni · L for a pseudorandom
L = EK(0). Let us stress that the first mask is τ1, so the first codeword γn0 = 0n is omitted.
This fact makes our attack somewhat more complicated, as the lack of the zero element
in the progression γn1 , γn2 , . . . will force us to argue over cosets of subgroups, instead of
subgroups directly.
The [LPSY16] Attack. [LPSY16] show an attack on PMAC using two messages of
length ` (for ` being any power of 2) with advantage roughly `/2n. This attack exploits
the fact that the first 2w codewords of the canonical Gray code form a subgroup of the
additive group of the finite field GF (2n). Hence, this two-query attack improves linearly
with the increasing message length `.
However, it is unclear whether this length-dependent attack can be generalized to a
larger number of queries q. This is because the two attack queries are derived from the
Gray code codewords being used, and are fully determined by them. Therefore, having
more available message queries does not increase the success probability of the attack.
Moreover, the set of L values that cause the two messages to collide on PMAC output is
also predetermined by these codewords. Hence, there is a simple countermeasure against
the attack: the user could simply avoid these “weak” keys.
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7.1 Our Attack on PMAC
In this section we present an attack which scales with q, achieving success probability
roughly `q2/2n against PMAC. Moreover, this attack is randomized, so no “weak” keys
exist, therefore a countermeasure against the [LPSY16] attack as mentioned above no
longer applies.
Our attack can be mounted against PMAC using a similar class of 1-wise independent
mask distributions as the attack in [LPSY16]. Namely, we assume that the masks are
derived as τi := pi ·R for some progression P = (p1, . . . , p2n) where every pi ∈ {0, 1}n, and
a value R $← {0, 1}n which we model as sampled uniformly at random.4 We assume that all
elements of P are distinct (any Gray code satisfies this property by definition). Our attack
differs from the one in [LPSY16] in the message construction, and the type of collisions
that it is aiming for. While in [LPSY16] the authors construct a pair of messages M,M ′
such that seCan(M) and seCan(M ′) occur with probability `/2n (over the choice of R),
we choose q messages M1, . . . ,Mq such that for every pair Mi,Mj of them, crCan(Mi,Mj)
occurs with probability `/2n.
7.1.1 Description
We will use the following notation: given messages (i.e., attack queries) M1, . . . ,Mq of
length ` each, we denote the i-th block of the a-th message by m(a)i . We also analogously
define x(a)i := m
(a)
i ⊕ pi ·R.
The adversary A := AO(·)`,q,n we present is parametrized by variables `, q, n (maximal
length of messages, number of messages, size of message blocks), and expects to interact
with an oracle O(·) that is either PMAC, or a random function. Its pseudocode is given as
Algorithm 1.
The adversary A first identifies the largest possible subset S ⊆ P[`] = (p1, . . . , p`) that
is an additive subgroup of GF (2n); or more generally, a coset of any group H in G, where
both H and G are additive subgroups of GF (2n) and do not need to be subsets of P[`].
We denote the order of S by `S and the indices of S within P[`] by IS . Additionally, we
choose an arbitrary fixed element e in S. If S is a group then for notational convenience
we choose e := 0, but this is of no significance to the attack, or its proof. Then, we denote
by I ′S the indices of S \ {e} within P[`].
Having identified S, the adversary samples q message blocks mˆ(1), . . . , mˆ(q) $← {0, 1}n
one by one, using a form of rejection sampling. Namely, it maintains a set
Ua−1 =
{
mˆ(b) ⊕ mˆ(c)
e⊕ pi : b, c ∈ [a− 1], b 6= c, i ∈ I
′
S
}
,
where a is the index of mˆ(a) currently sampled (intuitively, all u ∈ Ua−1 have the property
that if R = u then crCan(Mb,Mc) for some b 6= c ≤ [a − 1] occurs). A random value
sampled for mˆ(a) is then accepted, only if the intersection{
mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b)
e⊕ pi : b ∈ [a− 1], i ∈ I
′
S
}
∩ Ua−1
is not too large (more precisely, if it is not larger than roughly twice its expected value).
From the blocks mˆ(1), . . . , mˆ(q), A constructs a set of queries by repeating the same
4Note that this is not completely true for the value L described above, but we can afford this imprecision
when modelling an attack, as it obviously does not significantly affect its performance.
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Algorithm 1: Attacker AO(·)`,q,n against PMAC, where P = (p1, . . . , p2n−1)
1 IS := indices in P[`] of a coset S ⊆ P[`] of a subgroup H in an additive
group G ⊆ GF (2n)
2 `S := |S|
3 fix arbitrary e ∈ S (if S is a group, set e := 0)
4 I ′S := indices in P[`] of S \ {e}
5 U0 := ∅
6 for a := 1 . . . q do
7 repeat
8 mˆ(a)
$← {0, 1}n
9 until
∣∣∣{ mˆ(a)⊕mˆ(b)e⊕pi : b ∈ [a− 1], i ∈ I ′S} ∩ Ua−1∣∣∣ ≤ 2(a−1)3(`S−1)22n
10 Ua := Ua−1 ∪
{
mˆ(a)⊕mˆ(b)
e⊕pi : b ∈ [a− 1], i ∈ I ′S
}
11 Ma := ∅
12 for i := 1 . . . ` do
13 for a := 1 . . . q do
14 if i ∈ IS then
15 Ma := Ma||mˆ(a)
16 else
17 Ma := Ma||0n
18 for i := 1 . . . q do
19 Tagi := O(Mi)
20 for i := 1 . . . (q − 1) do
21 for j := (i+ 1) . . . q do
22 if Tagi = Tagj then
23 return 1
24 return 0
block ` times:
M1 = (mˆ(1))` = mˆ(1)||mˆ(1)|| . . . ||mˆ(1)
M2 = (mˆ(2))` = mˆ(2)||mˆ(2)|| . . . ||mˆ(2)
. . .
Mq = (mˆ(q))` = mˆ(q)||mˆ(q)|| . . . ||mˆ(q)
and then replaces all the blocks of these newly created messages that correspond to indices
not in IS by an all-zero block (in fact, any block with fixed value would do).
From this point on, the attack is simple: A submits the messages constructed above
as the attack queries; if there is a collision among the outputs of the oracle it outputs 1,
otherwise it outputs 0.
7.1.2 Analysis
We first look at the running time of A. The only nontrivial part of it that is worth
consideration is the loop on lines 7–9, which might potentially never terminate. However,
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note that the expected size of the set
E
mˆ(a)
$←{0,1}n
[∣∣∣∣{mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b)e⊕ pi : b ∈ [a− 1], i ∈ I ′S
}
∩ Ua−1
∣∣∣∣] ≤ (a− 1)3(`S − 1)22n ,
since each of the (a− 1)(`S − 1) elements of the set intersected with Ua−1 is individually
uniform over {0, 1}n, and we are assessing the probability that it hits the set Ua−1, where
|Ua−1| ≤ (a− 1)2(`S − 1). Hence, the probability that a single iteration of the loop fails to
satisfy the condition on line 9 is at most 1/2 by Markov’s inequality. Since every sampling
on line 8 is independent, the probability (for a fixed a) that the loop is executed more
than k times is upper bounded by 2−k.
Now we move on to analyze the advantage achieved by our attack.
Theorem 3. Let P = (p1, . . . , p2n) ∈ GF (2n) be a progression as defined above, and let
Tn be the mask distribution defined as τi = pi · R for a random R $← {0, 1}n. Let Π,Π′
be any distributions over Pn and assume that `q2 ≤ 2n−1. The adversary A`,q,n given in
Algorithm 1 achieves
AdvprfPMACΠ,Π′,Tn (A`,q,n) ≥
(`S − 1)(q − 1)2
2n+2 −
q2
2n ,
where `S is the order of the largest coset S of some subgroup H in an additive subgroup G
of GF (2n), such that the coset S is fully contained in P[`] = (p1, . . . , p`).
Note that as a special case, we can have S = G and hence `S may be the order of the
largest additive group contained in P[`].
Proof. We start by investigating the probability of crCan(Ma,Mb) for two distinct indices
a, b ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
Lemma 6. Let a, b be any two distinct indices from {1, . . . , q}. Then, we have
Pr [crCan(Ma,Mb)] ≥ `S − 12n .
Proof. (of Lemma 6) To slightly simplify the notation, we first prove the theorem for the
case where S is a group and then describe the straightforward extensions needed to handle
the case where S is a proper coset.
Let us hence assume that S is a group and therefore e = 0. We will denote by z the
index of e in P[`], i.e., pz = e = 0. For i ∈ I ′S , let ri denote the value
ri :=
mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b)
pi
, (13)
where the division occurs in GF (2n) (recall that i ∈ I ′S , and hence pi 6= 0). We observe
that if R is sampled to equal ri, we obtain
mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b) = R · pi = R · (pz ⊕ pi) , (14)
and hence
mˆ(a) ⊕ pz ·R = mˆ(b) ⊕ pi ·R , (15)
which is equivalent to x(a)z = x(b)i .
Moreover, we claim that if R = ri, we obtain a complete cross-cancellation for Ma and
Mb. To observe this, first note that the equation (15) also trivially implies x(a)i = x
(b)
z .
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Additionally, recall that we work in a field of characteristic 2, and hence the set {0 = pz, pi}
is a subgroup of S. Consequently, it induces a partition of S into `S/2 cosets of the form
{pj , pj ⊕ pi}, for j ∈ IS . For a fixed j, let k ∈ IS be an index, such that pk = pi ⊕ pj
(there is a unique such index, since S is a group). For each coset {pj , pk}, we then obtain
equalities x(a)j = x
(b)
k and x
(a)
k = x
(b)
j , since (14) also implies
mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b) = R · pi = R · (pj ⊕ pi ⊕ pj) = R · (pj ⊕ pk) .
This is true for any j ∈ IS (hence, for all the `S/2 cosets), implying a cross-cancellation.
Finally, note that for any i 6= j, we have ri 6= rj . This follows from equation (13), and
the fact that S is a group. Hence, whenever R is sampled to take any of the `S − 1 distinct
values {ri : i ∈ I ′S}, the event crCan(Ma,Mb) occurs, which concludes the proof for the
case where S is a group.
Now assume that the set S is a proper coset of some subgroupH in a group G ⊆ GF (2n).
Observe that S = e⊕H, hence we can rewrite any element p ∈ S as p = e⊕ h for some
h ∈ H and vice versa, h = e⊕ p. For the sake of argument, imagine that the values pi ∈ S
(note S ⊆ P[`] = (p1, . . . , p`)) on all positions in IS would be replaced by hi := pi ⊕ g ∈ H
instead; i.e., we would replace S by H in P[`] (recall that |S| = |H|). Then the previous
analysis (for S being a subgroup) would apply, since H is a group. Now, if a cross-
cancellation occurs in this modified setting with S replaced by H in P[`], then it also occurs
before the replacement, as we have
mˆ(a) ⊕ pi ·R = mˆ(b) ⊕ pj ·R⇔ mˆ(a) ⊕ (pi ⊕ e) ·R = mˆ(b) ⊕ (pj ⊕ e) ·R
⇔ mˆ(a) ⊕ hi ·R = mˆ(b) ⊕ hj ·R .
Hence, all the cancellations occur as before even if we replace H by S in P[`], and the rest
of the analysis remains the same.
The above lemma shows that for each Ma,Mb there are at least `S − 1 “good” values
R can take that would cause a cross-cancellation for Ma and Mb. Interestingly, this holds
even if Ma and Mb are constructed from arbitrary distinct fixed values mˆ(a) and mˆ(b).
Let us refer to these potential values of R as (a, b)-good, and let Ra,b denote the set of
all (a, b)-good values, formally
Ra,b = {r ∈ {0, 1}n : (R = r)⇒ crCan(Ma,Mb)} .
Let R = ⋃a 6=b∈[q]Ra,b denote the set of all good values.
We now need to show that when we look at all
(
q
2
)
pairs of A’s queries, most of these
good values for R will not overlap, giving us |R| = Ω(`Sq2) in total. To this end, we
leverage the rejection sampling that A used to choose the building blocks mˆ(a).
Lemma 7. Assuming `Sq2 ≤ 2n−1, we have
|R| ≥ (`S − 1)(q − 1)
2
4 .
Proof. (of Lemma 7) For a ∈ [q], let Va denote the set of fresh values that are added to
the set Ua−1 in the a-th iteration of step 10 of the algorithm AO(·)`,q,n to form the set Ua,
formally Va := Ua \ Ua−1. By the definition of Ua on line 10, and the fact that we only
count fresh values, we have
Va =
{
mˆ(a) ⊕ mˆ(b)
e⊕ pi : b ∈ [a− 1], i ∈ I
′
S
}
\ Ua−1 .
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The size of the set above before subtracting Ua−1 is (a− 1)(`S − 1), and by the choice of
mˆ(a) on lines 7–9, we know that the subtraction removes at most 2(a− 1)3(`S − 1)2/2n
elements. Hence, we have
|Va| ≥ (a− 1)(`S − 1)− 2(a− 1)
3(`S − 1)2
2n
≥ (a− 1)(`S − 1)
(
1− 2(a− 1)
2(`S − 1)
2n
)
≥ (a− 1)(`S − 1)2 ,
where the last inequality follows, since a2`S ≤ q2`S ≤ 2n−1. Clearly, Uq =
⋃q
a=1 Va, and
by construction the sets Va are disjoint. Hence, we obtain
|Uq| =
q∑
a=1
|Va| ≥
q∑
a=1
(a− 1)(`S − 1)
2 ≥
(`S − 1)(q − 1)2
4 .
Finally, by observations in the proof of Lemma 6, we have Uq ⊆ R. Therefore, we can also
conclude that |R| ≥ (`S−1)(q−1)24 .
To conclude the proof of Theorem 3, note that when O = PMAC, and if the randomly
sampled R takes any value from R, A observes a tag collision and outputs 1. According
to Lemma 7, this happens with probability at least (`S − 1)(q − 1)2/2n+2. On the other
hand, if O is a random function, A observes such a collision (and hence outputs 1) with
probability at most q2/2n.
Consider the Gray code used in the original PMAC construction. This code does not
include the zero element, hence the progression P = (p1, . . . , p2n−1) in this case does not
contain any additive groups. However, it does contain some proper cosets. To see this,
let Gi denote the additive subgroup of GF (2n) of size 2i containing elements of the form
0n−iw for w ∈ {0, 1}i. Then for any ` ≥ 2k − 1 we get that P[`] contains the only proper
coset of Gk−1 in Gk, which is of size 2k−1. This gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider the setting from Theorem 3, and let Tn be the mask distribution
defined as τi = γni · R for a random R $← {0, 1}n, and γni being the i-th codeword in the
canonical Gray code. Then, we have
AdvprfPMACΠ,Π′,Tn (A`,q,n) = Ω(`q
2/2n) .
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